Negative Utilitarianism - A Manifesto
by Dan
The doctrine of 'negative utilitarianism' (which I call 'negative utility' or 'NU' for short) requires as its sole purpose, a reality encompassing the least amount of suffering as possible throughout the universe. However before justifying this objective in our following discussion, it may be necessary to first understand what exactly is meant by 'suffering'.
The notion of what suffering is in accordance with NU will probably differ markedly from its conventional usage. It shall be defined very broadly as pertaining to any experience of discomfort, stress, torture, etc., or else any other feeling of the sort. Even if that feeling may seem only arbitrary, vague, or whatever else, it shall still be deemed as 'suffering', or else 'pain'.
Importantly, it is not categories or adjectives of pain such as those mentioned above which concern us here. Likewise, types of pain such as mental, physical, etc. are to be considered as peripheral to the concept of suffering itself. Rather, what concerns us is one dimensional, because pain, like numbers, can be equally present in all forms of experience. More specifically, only that immediate and (shall we say) undeniably "negative" experience per se can intrinsically be regarded as 'suffering' in its own right, such that it's existence cannot be refuted, whatever the circumstances.
Although we just referred to pain as "negative" (for want of a better word, but more on that later), this term is not to be taken in an emotive or subjective sense, but rather as an objective description of a phenomenon opposed to all other phenomena by its very nature. For instance, if one were to have their teeth filed down while conscious, it is not their emotive appraisal of their anguish (eg. "I deserve or hate this") but the actual dimension of suffering which counts as negative. Likewise, it is beside the point if pain occurs to me or someone else, whether that subject is guilty or innocent, animal or human, or whatever else, for all these things are merely contingent, albeit incidental matters of fact, rather than the actual dimension of suffering per se. For such facts by themselves make no difference to the ontological status or reality of suffering. Thus, in any instance, whether pain co-exists with pleasure, is desired by a sado-masochist or is inflicted upon someone perceived as "deserving" of it or not, pain is present all the same and thereby negative.
Before we continue, it should be noted that there are two differing continua comprising pain - that of 'intensity' and 'duration'. Suffering must partake of both simultaneously, for it could not exist without either. Hence I shall designate the term 'magnitude' as a collective term for these continua. Using these criteria, a precise measurement of pain is possible in theory, though this be complicated by certain considerations. Namely, intensity comprises a greater part of magnitude exponentially, than does duration. (This is discussed later in more detail, but at any rate, the elimination of pain takes priority for that which is of a greater magnitude).
It is difficult to explicitly state why suffering should be eliminated, for along with other rules of logic, this represents a 'first principle' which is either comprehended or not. Explaining the concept of pain to someone who hasn't experienced it would be impossible, let alone why it should be eliminated. Although presumably everyone knows what suffering is, the required insight concerning NU does not readily follow, perhaps due to the ego's inaccurate conception of pain, or more obviously because the ego is overwhelmingly preoccupied with illusions of meaning or value. The best we can do is attempt to first of all expose these illusions in order to sway the ego into acknowledging the validity of NU, so bear with me for a while as I stray from the topic.
When we speak of value or values, we are really giving expression to states of affairs that are seen to either should or should not be, for arguably, every intentional phenomenon is brought about as a result of its perceived value. Yet curiously enough, things which are valued (as well as things which are not) can all be reduced to contingent matters of fact. Furthermore, although they may seem compatible, objects of value share an arbitrary relationship in their attachment to value judgements, as it is always logically possible that they may be detached from them and conjoined virtually anywhere.(Many people can't come to grips with this idea because their own values are more compelling to them than any objective rationale, while having been exposed to only a limited range of values renders all other competing values as seemingly inconceivable.)
Arguably, the arbitrariness of values account for the infinity of contradictions which comprise our patchwork of moral systems. Yet the one thing all values have in common is that they're comprised entirely of what we ourselves are comprised of - namely, sense impressions. These impressions may vary in their arrangement, but all of them happen to be interpreted as purposeful in some way, such that we are in effect slaves to our own values. Like all other material objects, sense impressions and values can only exist as random points in an infinitely variable continuum of absolute givens (space, time, shape, size, composition, etc.). Since these impressions are existent (and therefore material) objects, they must all be reducible to these criteria, no matter how concrete or indeterminate they might appear.
Since the above contingencies are variable to an infinite degree, they are always relative. Any state of affairs which they comprise are insubstantial when considered alongside an infinity of possible alternatives. As such, all facts are inevitably as they are, simply because their various positions along the continuum make them as legitimate a possibility as any other. Thus to moralize in relation to any of these facts (eg. "x deserves y because of z") is merely to synthesize them in some random way and is about as pointless as being indignant towards a circle for being round.
The inescapable conclusion from all this is that 'everything is nothing' (ie. is insubstantial). Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that sense impressions (or whatever) should either entail the values conferred upon them or be logically prescriptive because of them. For to accept any one set of values legitimates all other possibilities to the effect that 'anything goes' - hence the human condition.
I bore you with this because it illustrates that one can say the same applies to NU, since our awareness of it is likewise comprised merely of sense impressions. Indeed, we would appear to succumb to the paradox of pure nihilism, but for one logical exception. That is, we are not concerned with sense impressions per se, but rather, the (a priori) logic or reason which we abstract from them. But that's not to say we necessarily need to know of logic in the first place, for unlike value, logic has nothing to do with how we feel towards it. It persists whether we deny it or not (for the very act of denial makes its existence all the more clear). It is, so to speak, an abstract reality, a series of logico-mathematical rules existing independently of us and without contradiction in the very way that numbers do. In a strictly non-subjective sense, logic 'describes' reality, but when left open to possibilities, it 'prescribes' it as well, and in both regards, values never play an active part. As such, there is no 'right and wrong', 'good and evil' or 'positive and negative' as I like to think, but only degrees of 'correct and incorrect' states of affairs. Indeed, the only logically correct prescriptive is the reality of NU (ie. the existence of the least pain possible). Our discussions of NU, like all else, should simply be a means to this end and nothing more.
The previous few paragraphs may have no direct relation to the validity of NU, but if they serve to nihilate our preoccupation with value, it remains to be seen that suffering is the only phenomenon that actually 'bothers' us in any real or logical sense. Indeed, everything else is trivial by comparison and curiously enough, without pain, there wouldn't be anything the matter. And even if somebody thought there was, so what? Their value-laden beliefs would be of no consequence - not that they necessarily are anyway. If I find the concept of NU unsavoury, the pain of my disgust is the problem, not NU, and so it goes for all value judgements.
(Positive) utilitarians might argue that the promotion of pleasure or happiness is just as important as NU, simply because they happen to value "feeling good". However, even if they were right (which they aren't), priority should nonetheless be given to NU, for in any case, better there be no suffering at all than the existence of pleasure, since the latter, like all else, is purely trivial by comparison. Indeed, pleasure should not even feature as an end in itself, for whether it exists or not, either way it's no loss. One can readily go without pleasure, for if it's not known it's not missed. Furthermore, in the face of suffering, the existence of pleasure is a completely frivolous and indifferent matter. Only pain is intrinsically incorrect and only its absence can properly be regarded as a correct state of affairs.
NU does not advocate either the absence or the existence of pleasure for its own sake. Like all else, pleasure is correct only insofar as it is a means to reduce suffering, as in the way music reduces stress. (Likewise, some suffering is correct only if it is necessary to reduce suffering of a greater magnitude). This may sound harsh, but probably because of our misconceptions, since many of us believe that without pleasure there is only pain (eg. boredom or melancholy), and vice versa. Yet, while this may often be true of our own lives, it is not necessarily the case, for it is quite conceivable for both pleasure and suffering to be simultaneously non-existent, such as in the absence of all life.
However, NU only becomes reality when all other states of affairs serve as an effective means to it in a purely pragmatic fashion. As such it would be counter-productive to eliminate all known life if there is a strong possibility of greater suffering in some unforeseen 'afterlife' (eg. reincarnation or hell). The same argument would apply if the organisms which comprise life (eg. people) have the potential to eliminate greater suffering elsewhere in the universe (yet alone their own pain). Therefore, in order to bring about NU, it is crucial that the most effective course of action be formulated in advance (Which arguably might include much research to expose the nature of suffering, as well as education, debate and the like, but more on that later).
As there are many factors which influence the pervasiveness of NU, these must be accorded their correct priorities. For although most of us are already advancing NU in some way (mostly through hedonism), the result is usually marginal and offset by sufferings of a greater magnitude. We mentioned earlier that the elimination of such suffering (ie. of greater magnitude) takes priority, and because this is an integral part of NU, it is crucial to firstly understand the dimensions which (at least in theory) make its measurement possible. Only then can we hope to proceed in the most logically correct manner in order that NU becomes reality.
We ask now that you turn your attention to the graph. It illustrates the principle explained earlier, namely the measurement of pain's magnitude in terms of both intensity and duration, whereby 'magnitude' collectively refers to both these dimensions and thus the actual degree of suffering experienced. (Because intensity can also measure pleasure (as well as pain) the former is normally measured by units called 'hedons' and the latter by 'dolors'. But since hedons don't directly concern us, we shall avoid confusion by using the term 'intensity' only insofar as it pertains to dolors).
In reference to the graph, one may be deceived into thinking that intensity and duration are equal multiples of magnitude, such that any point along each axis need simply be multiplied with its counterpart in order to obtain the magnitude. Yet it is clear that objectively, intensity forms a larger component of magnitude than duration. This is particularly the case where intensity is considerably high, hence its exponential influence on magnitude (which should be shown as a curve).
To illustrate this point, let's assume for argument's sake that one hundred dolours is equivalent to experiencing torture. As such, it would be more logical to experience a mild ten dolors over 100 minutes than vice versa (ie. 100 dolors over ten minutes), assuming that one were forced to choose between the two. And this is despite that fact that both choices would each yield an excruciating (though false) magnitude of 1,000, had we simply multiplied intensity with duration. (I wont estimate any actual magnitudes as they still elude me). Yet although intensity comprises the more dominant part of magnitude, in certain cases (which remain unclear), the influence of intensity may be superseded by prolonged duration. For instance, it is arguable that the experience of 100 dolors over one minute is preferable to being irritated by 10 dolors for the rest of eternity.
To confuse things further (believe me, it does), a 'fourth dimension' (ie. a manifold one called the 'minds' axis) operates in conjunction with the others. The dimensions discussed so far can only refer to suffering in linear form and as such are only restricted to single instances - namely that of individual minds. For it is only in a purely 'immediate' or 'existential' sense that pain (like all sense impressions) is experienced uniformly by only one particular mind (or consciousness) at any given moment. (Hence I am only aware of my own pain and no one else's). And yet, although I do not experience it, suffering may equally be present elsewhere in other minds (assuming they exist) which are likewise independent of each other's contents. Thus in reality, suffering exists in a plural state as separate occurrences (ie. amongst separate minds), rather than as a homogenous unit. And it is these which are numbered individually upon the 'minds' axis. (It should also be stressed that we are here concerned only with the suffering inside each mind, rather than minds per se).
Although suffering may occur in separate minds, these are all nonetheless identical phenomena insofar as they are subject to the same underlying principles of NU, and may only differ individually in their degree of intensity, duration and magnitude. Yet in the same way that duration cannot directly be multiplied by intensity to form magnitude, it is likewise the case that the various magnitudes of each mind cannot be multiplied by the number of minds in order to obtain an overall or net magnitude encompassing all those minds. For if that were the case, 100 separate minds, each suffering from (let's say) a mild magnitude of ten, would in effect comprise an excruciating magnitude of 1,000, which would be nowhere remotely near to the actual magnitude suffered. Nonetheless, there is at least one way to obtain the overall magnitude, namely as follows:
All the minds can be 'added together' (as it were) to comprise their combined duration. For it is perfectly logical to say that 100 minds, each suffering for ten minutes, comprise 1000 minutes of suffering (which is analogous to 100 labourers, each working for 10 hours, comprising 1,000 man hours). This manoeuvre involves simply adding or aligning each mind consecutively alongside one another in linear fashion for the length of their combined duration, thereby eliminating the need for an explicit 'minds' axis. Thus with one less dimension to think about, we are now free to calculate the overall magnitude as before, such that it be influenced by duration and intensity in the usual manner rather than being quantified out of all proportion.
An exact measurement of magnitude remains somewhat elusive, while the graph is still only a crude concept. In addition, there remains the dilemma faced by the actual measurement of pain, as well as the practical implications of eliminating it most effectively. Nonetheless, the above exposition may at least provide some insight into revealing an exact ratio between intensity, duration and the so-called 'minds' axis in their fusion of magnitude. If this were ascertained, NU could be simplified to an exact equation and priority could then be given to reduce suffering of a higher magnitude. This is a most urgent objective, especially when considering the possible existence of astronomical magnitudes which could make all the hells on this earth dwindle by comparison.
SOME IDEAS REGARDING THE ADVANCEMENT OF NU
It is perhaps only when the great bulk of humanity is convinced of the validity of NU and is motivated in whatever way necessary to make it happen, that it will be most pervasive. Although this process may appear untenable or naive, on the contrary, many of the conditions enabling it to occur are already in place and should naturally lead to the eventual popularisation of NU (perhaps in the form of a "NU age", if you pardon the pun). Although if this does eventuate, care must be taken to avoid the stifling influence of blind ideology, personal whims or the like, for it would be pointless to have the concept of NU parodied as another empty fad without the reality of NU taking place.
It may be argued that historically, values are periodically displaced under the influence of nihilism, only to be replaced by another set of values. Indeed, the current human condition is largely compatible with, as well as much in favour of nihilist sentiments. Since much of the twentieth century has culminated towards this stage and and we continue to be globalised by it, we are currently presented with an ideal opportunity to neutralize the prescriptive influence of all future values and advance NU in their place. This shouldn't prove too difficult for (unlike many existing political doctrines) the simplicity of NU as a principle should be readily conducive to understanding and consensus. Furthermore, water-tight arguments (including those which explicate the many contradictions and other follies of values) can potentially serve to systematically thwart criticism - rational or otherwise.
In advocating NU, one can avoid alienating people by maintaining a non-partisan stance based purely upon logical and pragmatic objectives, in the same way that scientific institutions supposedly do. Potentially, NU can appeal to as well as transcend all classes, creeds, etc., particularly as people are susceptible to disillusionment with the values they hold. Furthermore, the immersion of civilization in cyberspace presents a huge opportunity for disseminating information among the masses without the distortion of self-interested institutions such as corporations, universities or the media, nor the need for limited 'artisan labour' such as seminars or petty activism.
Of course I'm not exactly adding to human knowledge with any of the above, as these issues have probably been documented many times already. So instead of placing too much emphasis on 'reinventing the wheel' and articulating ideas of which I remain largely ignorant, much more emphasis needs to be directed towards obtaining relevant feedback from around the globe and synthesizing this into a logical plan for action, whatever that might be. Therefore comments, constructive criticisms or other information relating to NU, nihilism or whatever is always welcome.
23 comments:
Question: Does NU necessarily lead to antinatalism, or is antinatalism just one manifestation that NU can take?
Some argue that genuine negative utilitarianism necessarily entails not only antinatalism, but painless destruction of the world if possible.
I think recognizing non-experiential value (e.g., that death can be a harm to a person who wants to keep living, even if it's not painful) gets around this problem of NU without allowing reproduction.
I have tried to show that we are much more negative-utilitarian than we realize in the context of inflicting consequences on others - see my ever-charming Rape Doctor Hypothetical, my analysis of whether to give a stranger a peanut or a tab of ecstasy, and my examination of such lovely topics as creating incest children, massively increasing population to make a huge slum world, and advertising to children.
Hey, I only do Rape Therapy in my spare time, okay?!
The Doctor is out...
I tend to see voluntary antinatalism as the compromise position in fulfilling the NU imperative. There’s still harm involved on both emotional and economic levels. If we limit ourselves to experiential values, the best hypothetical course of action might be, say, a super-weapon that instantly obliterates the biosphere. Of course, such an action would entail tremendous harm from the perspective of a non-experiential oriented values system. How about we kick the effrontery down a notch, then, moving from destruction to coercion? Say a biochemically engineered ‘Children of Men’ scenario, permanent birth control in the drinking water or dispersed on the winds. Less appalling? Or more, because of the negative consequences afterward? Where do we draw the line in our cost/benefits analysis regarding prevention of future harm? It seems to me that there’s a level of arbitrariness built into this discussion rooted purely in emotions, and that because of this there’s really no ‘right’ answer that fits into any deontological framework. Each of us has to live with the perceived consequences of our philosophical positions, and it’s tempting to look outside ourselves for a certain amount of superlunary justification, as if we can ‘discover’ the right position to take. I can’t help but wonder if we’re looking to be absolved from the negative consequences of our beliefs.
I ask myself, if a button suddenly appeared on my desk that would blow up the world, would I push it? I hope that I would, and yet...I’m sure I’d hesitate, and very well might not be able to go through with it. Why? Ostensibly, it’s because I have the same problems with murder and coercion that most people have. Fragments of deontological pre-suppositions- or, ‘intuitions’- inform my thinking as much as anyone else, I suppose. But why should they? At heart I’m a consequentialist, and this tied in with my feelings about endemic suffering should make my decision easy. Why, then, do I hesitate?
Whenever I’m out walking, I pick up earthworms that have wriggled their way out onto the sidewalk and throw them back on the lawn, but every time I do this I shudder a little, because I know most of them are already too far gone, and I’m just prolonging the agony. And yet, every time I see a bee struggling along on the pavement, I immediately step on it, which brings on this weird sensation of feeling both good and bad about myself at the same time. Which says...what? LOL! I have NO fucking idea. Only, if that button does happen to appear on my desk, I’m going to push it before I have any time to think about it.
Jim, your first sentence is all you needed: "I tend to see voluntary antinatalism as the compromise position in fulfilling the NU imperative." Anything to do with coercion, other than soft persusion (which is just encouragement, not coercion in my opinion), would be going to far. I do not think you need to be a strict consequentialist to have this position. Can you be a negative utilitarianist without being a strict consequentialist? I believe so, and without compromising your logic. Fundamental rights of choice are good in and of themselves, and we may say thats deontological. However, without rights humans have no agency to make their own decisions in order to maximize their own utility (or minimize the painful aspects of harm as NU proposes). Given the choice between being a part of a collective (lets say extreme aspects of the Stalinist USSR) or part of a country that at least strives for individual choice (lets say the USA), I would pick the latter as the correct model as individual choice presupposes individual decisions regarding utility. Why would I ever work for the collective when it self-negates any choice whatsoever? I CHOOSE to not promote suffering for another generation, that choice wasn't made for me. That makes a lot of difference in the world of ethical cost/benefit analsysis.
Sorry for grammatical errors.. I did not have spell/grammar check on this computer and I tend to just send out my comments without editing them. I will try to be more careful next time. Even though a good philosopher can have bad grammar, it looks bad and may detract from the argument.
Compoverde:
"Anything to do with coercion, other than soft persusion (which is just encouragement, not coercion in my opinion), would be going to far."
This is sort of what I'm talking about. Going too far to whom? Or to whose set of negative utilitarian principles? Setting aside blowing up the world for the somewhat less drastic option, what would you say if you knew a guy who was perfecting a sterilizing virus? Would you dissuade him? Turn him in? Or let's say a virus from some unbeknownst source has already taken hold, and you secretly hold the antidote? Would you offer it to the world, or flush it down the toilet? And would you be inclined to draw a moral distinction between these two scenarios?
LOL! I don't mean to grill you, Compoverde. Just thinking outloud. What I'm curious about is if you see your position as justified against some unwavering standard, or are you just shooting from the hip according to a self-admittedly subjective aesthetic principle. I tried to outline my own feelings about this stuff in my book. Maybe I should eventually try and write something more deliberate in the near future.
As always, thanks for your thoughtful responses.
Good points Jim. It seems NU does not allow for the idea of individual choice if taken to the extreme. Is there any arguments you can fathom that protect choice, liberty, consent, and these type of concepts without destroying the aims NU is trying to get at? NU seems to go too far in attaining the ends while destroying the (already) living beings.
Something can be unethical and still legal. For example, those who eat meat may be seen as unethical, but it is legal. (I personally don't agree that eating meat is unethical, but it is an example). Procreation, though unethical should not be illegal. Even if it was illegal, to have the state or certain members be officially sanctioned to mess with the biology of other members in such an invasive way is not conducive to a just society. If this was the case, then people predisposed to act in a criminal manner should be incapacitated in some physical invasive way at a young age when signs are apparent that they are likely to be criminal offenders in the future. This is a case where the youth might be behaving unlawfully, and unethically, but it would still be unjust for the state to invasively alter the wrongdoer (for example cutting out a piece of brain matter of the criminal that might be associated with anti-social behavior).
I'm sure I would hesitate to push the button, too, just like Jim. But here's an essay on doing vs. allowing harm. It makes a pretty good case that there are no morally significant distinctions between the two (as long as you ignore intentions and the like). So while you are busy congratulating yourself on not getting your hands dirty, more atrocious harm may occur that could have been prevented. Not to mention the fact that if you subscribe to the Epicurean view of being dead, there is no one who is harmed merely by ceasing to exist, so no problems with the doomsday button scenario.
Free will is an illusion anyway, so why keep up the charade? This discussion reminds me of the Mormon concept of Premortal Existence and the Plan of Salvation. Satan's plan to force us all to choose good so that we can all become gods later seems optimal. But no, Jesus and his asshole father decide to make all of us go through all this shit for the benefit of the very few who will manage to kiss God's ass enthusiastically enough to make it. But hey, we got to keep our free agency (whatever the hell that means). After leaving Mormonism, I kept wondering why it never occurred to me that Lucifer was the good guy.
CM, I guess this really just goes back to the old debates of deontological and utilitarian ways of looking at morality. In this case we can say rights based vs. community-consequentialist based. I guess the whole notion of individual rights is really a tricky subject, and requires notions of free agency. Also, some communities value individual decision-making more than others. Some tribes prefer collective decision-making for example. This is not necessarily better or worse off in a cultural relative perspective. I pose as a first-order basis for ethics that empathy and self-interestedness are two foundations for universal ethics, (manifested along historical-cultural delineations in many different forms). The answer then might be that we cannot discount our ancestral traditions (from America and European heritage let's say), that individual rights are being violated. These rights, insofar as they are just, are just because they have been upheld as being (more or less) our manifestations of the more basic foundational universal ethics of empathy and self-interestedness. We would be changing the basis for our whole tradition of which we take for granted and are deciding right now (for anti-procreation) if we thought in different scenarios (that are not based on this tradition of rights.. although there can be plenty of instances where rights have been violated en masse for a "greater cause")
Now you might pose to me the argument that antinatalism is correct, then goes against these traditions passed down from American and European heritage of individual rights based beliefs (from 1700s onwards lets say).. and that I am being inconsistent at best because that same tradition values procreation as well as rights. However, I am not being inconsistent. I am actually being more consistent. Reason being that I am not destroying the foundation for which I make ethical decisions whilst making my ethical decisions. The idea that we can have a doomsday machine scenario, presupposes a society that let me think in individual choices (that I would want a doomsday scenario).. To then destroy that foundation which lead me to a conclusion that seemed right, just, or ethical (and lead me to them without being harmed, persecuted, or mitigated for doing so), would be to take the situation for granted and be a possibly hypocritical move. Within the larger foundation of individual choice and rights of choice, there is a huge amount of freedom to choose what the best choice is for the individual. This is where individuals can look at things utilitarian wise (possibly NU wise) and realize that the best outcome for THEIR INDIVIDUAL potential child is to not have been born. They may also strongly advocate, lobby, and cajole others to have the same view, but not coerce them to.
Maybe this is all rambling bullshit, and I am holding up very weak arguments. This might be true. I am just trying to pose a little debate, and food for thought.. sorry for my poor way of conveying thoughts. In other words, what I am trying to say is I am not saying your scenarios are wrong.. In fact you may be right, I am just being the devil's advocate for now. I am trying to see if there is a position where rights-based ethics can be used as a foundation while still advocating for a consequentialist ethical stance such as the David Benatar formulation of antinatalism. I supposed Mills can be pointed to as a consequentilist who propped up rights as the best course for utilitarian consequences.
Now that I think of it, I guess vaccinations for babies, and fluoride in the public water would be examples of utilitarian without rights based actions, which I would consider a right thing.. so I defeated my own argument haha.
CM:
This is sort of off the subject, but since you brought up free will you might appreciate this link.
On another topic. Would anyone be willing to work with me on ideas pamphlet advocating anitnatalism? This can be a nice summarization of the philosophy and why it would be beneficial to follow it.
Compoverde:
That seems like an EXCELLENT idea!
Can someone help me respond to a post I received on a philosophy forum? I originally posted:
It seems that in this internet community, but in the philosophical community at large, Philosophical Pessimism as expounded by Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Mainlander, Benatar, and Zapffe are discredited as people simply making negative value statements. They are not seen as having valuable insights into why existence itself is not a good thing to be born into and that it is wrong to create future beings. Look at Wikipedia on Zapffe for example:
Zapffe's theory is that humans are born with an overdeveloped skill (understanding, self-knowledge) which does not fit into nature's design. The human craving for justification on matters such as life and death cannot be satisfied, hence humanity has a need that nature cannot satisfy. The tragedy, following this theory, is that humans spend all their time trying not to be human. The human being, therefore, is a paradox.
In The Last Messiah Zapffe described four principal defense mechanisms that humankind uses to avoid facing this paradox:
Isolation is "a fully arbitrary dismissal from consciousness of all disturbing and destructive thought and feeling".[1]
Anchoring is the "fixation of points within, or construction of walls around, the liquid fray of consciousness".[1] The anchoring mechanism provides individuals a value or an ideal that allows them to focus their attentions in a consistent manner. Zapffe also applied the anchoring principle to society, and stated "God, the Church, the State, morality, fate, the laws of life, the people, the future"[1] are all examples of collective primary anchoring firmaments.
Distraction is when "one limits attention to the critical bounds by constantly enthralling it with impressions".[1] Distraction focuses all of one's energy on a task or idea to prevent the mind from turning in on itself.
Sublimation is the refocusing of energy away from negative outlets, toward positive ones. The individual distances him / herself and looks at their existence from an aesthetic point of view (e.g., writers, poets, painters.) Zapffe himself pointed out that his produced works were the product of sublimation.
This makes a lot of sense. It is not proven through scientific means. However, nothing of an ethical character really is. Science is just empirical enough to explain physiological phenomenon, not the human condition. I run into the problem that all such notions of existence then are amoral. There is no right or wrong way of things. There is not truth beyond the pragmatic value of scientific discovery.
The responder answered:
I think part of the reason why this is the case is that bad arguments against pessimism look a lot like good arguments against pessimism. For example, Benatar's pessimism is usually rejected out of hand on "common-sense" moral grounds. It would seem preferable to contend instead his argument's asymmetry relations. But deontic asymmetry is nevertheless presumptively hedonistic. Thus anyone claiming a counter-argument finds herself in some sense having, like Holtug, to ask, "how can anything be worse for a person who does not exist?"
A second, more germane, example is in your argument; worlds in which "all such notions of existence then are amoral" are not worlds in which hedonistic pessimism would obtain.
The pessimist's commonest allegation is that it is wrong to start lives because doing so would bring about more harm or pain than would otherwise occur. This is not--to me, at least--a very compelling argument; it is not obvious that all lives are painful or that non-existence is always preferable to existence. But this is precisely what hedonistic pessimists have to claim and they have to justify these claims on epistemically objective grounds. It isn't apparent to me that in order to reject pessimism one should have to prove it false (though a single case of disconfirmation would generally entail as much); it should suffice to show that there are no grounds for preferring a pessimistic interpretation of life to an optimistic one--or, as in your view--a neutral one.
Zappfe's argument, on the other hand, is ultimately--and anomolously--logical. I don't know enough about it to evaluate its validity, although it seems to me that a paradox, by itself, would not be enough to compel one to full-pessimism (though it of course could), and that any subsequent theoretical elaboration would tend to move Zappfe' s argument in a hedonistic direction. In any case, I would not and will not dismiss his argument because it is unappealing; such is the behavior, after all, to which you rightfully object. And on that point, at least, I agree with you completely.
Could someone who is more familiar with formal philosophical terminology help me interpret and respond to the argument this poster is trying to say?
I keep wanting to thank you for the link, Jim. I love the rebuttal to Saul Smilansky's idea that people should be led to believe in free will, or morality will collapse. I think people like you are pretty good evidence to the contrary.
CM:
Did you read 'Luck swallows everything' by Strawson? That's one of my favorites.
Yes, it's a great piece. It's amazing that people find the idea that they pulled themselves by the hair out of some primordial swamp more convincing.
"Only pain is intrinsically incorrect and only its absence can properly be regarded as a correct state of affairs."
" Like all else, pleasure is correct only insofar as it is a means to reduce suffering, as in the way music reduces stress"
I haven't read the entire post but this is the problem that I have with NU. I agree that only the minimization of suffering is *necessary* so minimizing suffering should be prioritized over maximizing happiness for it's own sake but I disagree that happiness has no intrinsic, positive value. If suffering is of intrinsic, negative value then happiness has to be of intrinsic, positive value since happiness is the opposite of suffering. Being unconscious is of neutral value, neither good or bad. Maximizing happiness for it's own sake is unnecessary but desirable. I don't know where my views fit in since I disagree with both the classical utilitarians who think that increasing happiness is equally as important as minimizing stress and the negative utilitarians who deny that happiness has any intrinsic value at all. I just call myself a hedonist.
Also, I think your claim that a painless death would be a harm or bad (for the deceased) despite the fact that only suffering is of intrinsic negative value is inconsistent. I don't consider a painless death to be 'harmful', in the positive sense, but it is 'bad', negatively speaking, on the basis that it deprives someone of something good (pleasure). I'm still an anti-natalist because I have no idea what kind of life my future children could have but if there is no value in happiness, why would depriving (an already existing) someone of all possible future happiness be a bad thing?
Most people are going to reproduce, good or bad, so I hope the possibility of genetically engineering sentient beings who are hyper-empathetic and physiologically incapable of non-negligible stress becomes a reality. There would be nothing wrong with a world without sentient beings, but a world filled with sentient beings who are in a constant state of euphoria and love would be *even* better.
I think you're splitting hairs over semantics, Anon. I don't think there is a single one of us here who would claim that our contentment (happiness, pleasure... call it what you will) is something which holds zero value to us personally. We all want to feel "good", regardless of how we must attain that positive feeling. The only only reason we strive for this end though, is because two other humans chose to impose upon us (by having sex) and bring us into their world without our personal consent. That personal consent is always impossible to attain because one does not exist until two others make a choice to act. I'm not going to get into a debate about the moment sentience becomes a viable attribute, because the point is moot from the antinatal perspective. I can only speak for myself, as I too would consider myself a hedonist... but seriously, who isn't? Even sadists derive pleasure from watching/causing others to suffer (which is disgusting). For the record, I consider anyone who actively promotes "life as we know it" to be a sadist.
A "painless" death is a negative because if one were never born, then that person would never have to experience the time leading up to nor the very moment of death. Since I believe this imposition, this "gift" (which was bestowed without permission to an individual who was, for all intents and purposes, free before being thrust into this world) is the actual wrong-doing, I cannot see how anyone can claim death is not a harm to the one who dies. I am not saying death is a harm because it deprives one of current earthly pleasures, but because it causes intense feelings of physical pain and dread for the victim, and sorrow for those left behind. Being born was never necessary nor right, therefore death by "natural causes" is violence inflicted by a mother and father, while murder would be death caused by the actions of an additional party.
When humans willfully reproduce, they are proclaiming to the world and their offspring, "Listen up, this world is good enough for me; so it's good enough for you. Now stop whining and do what I tell you!" That's why I just have to laugh whenever I hear anyone complaining about teenagers getting pregnant. "They're just babies having babies!" is what I hear, or something along those lines. Well, I've yet to meet a single "grown-up" with kids of their own. The only adults I've ever known are wise enough to understand the consequences of their actions. Not a single one of them would ever make more people, nor would they promote the creation of non humans for this assembly line meat grinder.
Take care
Hedonism is a theory of value that states : happiness is the only intrinsic good and stress is the only intrinsic bad. My understanding was that Negative Utilitarians, like Classical Utilitarians, are hedonists (or 'negative' hedonists, if they deny the intrinsic, positive value of happiness). This is a claim about what actually is universally valuable, the fact that some people have a positive attitude towards stress or a negative attitude towards happiness is irrelevant. You make it seem as though you 'personally' value your pleasure but you don't 'personally' dis-value your own stress, you regard all stress as intrinsically bad as a matter of fact. Again, the opposite of suffering is not the absence of suffering, the opposite of suffering is happiness. Since every positive has a negative, anyone who claims that stress is intrinsically bad has to concede that happiness is intrinsically good. Also, as a minor point, consent (in my view) is of no intrinsic, moral value. Consent is only required to prevent unwanted, or stressful, states of mind (petting a dog does not require his or her consent since it's assumed that the dog will not suffer as a result). If suffering did not exist, we would not require the consent of unborn children to create them. Alas, it does so I'm with you.
If you claim to be a hedonist, then you have to accept that being unconscious is of neutral value, neither good or bad. Hedonists are consequentialists, the consequences of an action are what make it good or bad. An action that increases suffering or happiness can not be considered good or bad even if the actor had good or bad intentions (only intentions are moral/immoral, actions are just good or bad based on the actual effect that they have on the emotional state of mind of everyone affected by the action). Not all deaths are painful, at least not in theory. From a hedonist point of view, only stress is harmful.If someone was killed painlessly in their sleep, this death would not be harmful, at least not for the deceased. If you claim that something besides stress is harmful, you've abandoned hedonism (since hedonists deny that life itself or the entities that experience happiness/stress have any intrinsic value/dis-value, only happiness/stress have intrinsic value/dis-value).
I'm not really criticizing the NU view because it's the view I'm leaning towards. The worst, logical conclusions to classical utilitarianism (ie. raping a small child if it will produce a greater amount of happiness for, say, 10 people) are far worse than the worst conclusions of NU (ie. killing someone in their sleep, if it could be done without causing any stress to them or their friends, family members etc. to prevent them or someone else from stubbing their toe). It's better to be unconscious than it is to suffer but, it's also better to be happy than it is to be unconscious, which is why I hope the bio-abolition of suffering becomes a reality. Why hasn't this possibility been mentioned by anti-natalists like Jim Crawford and David Benatar?
www.huruma.tumblr.com
That's why I, so far, can't accept negative utilitarnanism in its purest form. If we are to retain human dignity, we must temper it with:
Self-sovereignty (the right to determine your own destiny, the right to be secure in their own person), and[1]
Social Contract Theory (the responsibilities, duties, and obligations you have toward other members of society to, at the very least not cause suffering toward them)
With both the above modifying NU, then we can say some actions to eliminate suffering are morally wrong regardless of the amount of good it does (e.g., forcibly extracting a kidney from someone with 2 kidneys in order to save another from misery caused by a non-functioning kidney).
[1]Nod to Chip: I use this phrase of Garrett's because it avoids the problem of "selling yourself" that the phrase self-ownership implies. Self-Sovereignty works, IMO, because - thinking in terms of constitutionally-divided prerogatives - a US state may be inferior to the US Fed Gov't in many matters but the states still retain certain prerogatives and rights. Same thing with social contract theory as I presented it.
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