tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post3429112196688668805..comments2023-12-31T04:10:49.722-08:00Comments on Antinatalism- The Greatest Taboo: 'Confessions of an Antinatalist' Review in 'Cryonics Magazine'Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger70125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-85998725035761288162010-12-22T22:27:03.926-08:002010-12-22T22:27:03.926-08:00timcoojimans-
"money does not buy you experi...timcoojimans-<br /><br /><i>"money does not buy you experiential happiness, but lack of money certainly buys you misery"</i><br /><br />Haven't you and The Plague Doctor had a debate along those lines a while back? Having money certainly <i>is</i> better than the alternative, but it doesn't mean it's good enough. I also remember a reference to a study that found that people treat "better" as "best", which could also explain a lot of what goes on in people's heads. Unfortunately, I can't for the life of me remember where I saw that.CMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-70574226944822366602010-12-22T22:26:40.044-08:002010-12-22T22:26:40.044-08:00Compoverde-
Do you have any suggestions how to re...Compoverde-<br /><br /><i>Do you have any suggestions how to refute the non-identity issue that Benkei raises?</i><br /><br />My only suggestion is to stop wasting your time with that guy. He is not interested in a productive dialog or the facts, which was evident a long time ago. Just leave him to (incorrectly) interpret the quotations he steals from Wikipedia. It's what he does best.CMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-78398388282541120992010-12-22T13:24:50.600-08:002010-12-22T13:24:50.600-08:00Here's a good read on this identity stuff-
ht...Here's a good read on this identity stuff-<br /><br />http://docs.law.gwu.edu/stdg/gwlr/issues/pdf/DeGrazia-77-5-6.pdf<br /><br />Not sure if it's been posted before, but I'll include it in the library just in case.metamorphhhhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12754527748086296743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-14801416016483961842010-12-22T10:10:54.115-08:002010-12-22T10:10:54.115-08:00Compoverde: Ok, one more then :)
Tobias raises qu...Compoverde: Ok, one more then :)<br /><br />Tobias raises questions on forum: <br /><br />"How can I experience an absence, like an absence of pain? and if it can't experienced, what makes it good?"<br /><br />It seems to me that we experience absences all the time. In fact, I'd say that 'relief' (from pain, for example) and 'feels good' are practically synonymous. <br /><br /> Doesn't good require a subject for whom something is good?<br /><br />If we include absence of suffering as 'good', then no. It's why we put suffering animals to sleep, because we recognize that non-existence is better than existence in those cases.<br /><br />I can't experience abscence of pain, but I can experience pain. Doesn;t that make pain a rare event compared to the default state of absence of pain?<br /><br />Of course, the amount of pain varies from life to life. I would agree that extreme instances of pain aren't experienced by everybody, though they're far from rare. However, depression is a kind of pain, often crippling, and is experienced by millions upon millions of people all over the world. They learn to live with it (sometimes, and for various reasons), but it colors most of their waking hours. <br /><br />If abscence of pain is the default state, does that not mean that life is generally good?"<br /><br />Again, some lives are better than others. However, if we are to make absence of pain the marker, then any situation you can come up with falls short of the perfect absence of pain that describes non-existence. Admittedly, the conversation is a little more complicated than that, but I thought I just deal directly with the question asked.metamorphhhhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12754527748086296743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-63950662854021743872010-12-22T09:46:33.347-08:002010-12-22T09:46:33.347-08:00Compoverde:
This'll be my last response, as I...Compoverde:<br /><br />This'll be my last response, as I think all that can be said has already been said from my side...<br /><br /><br />"I am now Jehovah. Benkei has been a bad boy in my eyes, and I'm about to send him to the everlasting torments of hell. Forever and ever he will have the flesh flayed from him bones, over and over again. <br /><br />However...<br /><br />I have just finished the most delightful repast of ambrosia and dark beer, and am feeling...generous. I've decided to give Benkei an option of a simple, painless death. Back to non-existence, if he so chooses."<br /><br />Benkei said:<br />"Of course the question can be posed and I prefer not to go through everlasting torment so I would opt for death. However, since I no longer exist I cannot claim to be better off, since I don't exist. My non-existence precludes me from making meaningful statements about the well-being of my non-existence and therefore precludes me from comparing it to my state of well-being while alive."<br /><br />Nobody's argued that the non-existent can make statements. We're talking about value judgments regarding the hypothetical, but not from within the hypothetical. And when he says that he prefers death to everlasting torment, he has decided that non-existence is better than existence in this case, and his argument just comes down to semantics.<br /><br />"The conclusion is therefore derived, not from a comparison of states between existence and no-existence, but a comparison between life as I know it and life as it would be. It is not that non-existence is better but that eternal suffering is unacceptable as I understand how life should be."<br /><br />It is DEFINITELY that non-existence is better that eternal hell, which is why he's choosing non-existence over hell. The only point where 'life as he knows it' comes into play is in providing him examples of deprivation and other experiential suffering, which informs his decision in choosing non-existence over hell. He asks himself "Hm, would I be better off being tortured for eternity, or dead? I choose dead!" And I, as a third party, can then stand back and agree in good confidence "He's better off being non-existent, than he would have been suffering in hell for eternity." <br /><br />Compoverde: At some point, you just have to let these conversations end. I don't see either one of you budging. Naturally, I agree with your premise, but this kind of thing can go on forever (hint, hint):)metamorphhhhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12754527748086296743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-79498128967933861172010-12-22T09:27:32.546-08:002010-12-22T09:27:32.546-08:00Tobias raises questions on forum:
"How can ...Tobias raises questions on forum: <br /><br />"How can I experience an absence, like an absence of pain? and if it can't experienced, what makes it good? Doesn't good require a subject for whom something is good? I can't experience abscence of pain, but I can experience pain. Doesn;t that make pain a rare event compared to the default state of absence of pain? If abscence of pain is the default state, does that not mean that life is generally good?"Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-84773435392685760472010-12-22T09:26:32.511-08:002010-12-22T09:26:32.511-08:00CM... I noticed that you had a very similar case y...CM... I noticed that you had a very similar case you were working with back in the Ben Bradley article:<br /><br /><br />Ben Bradley's BENATAR AND THE LOGIC OF BETTERNESS spends a lot of its time knocking down strawmen. The very first sentence of part I is a mischaracterization. Professor Benatar only uses pains and pleasures as exemplars of harms and benefits (p. 30, BNtHB), and makes no claims about hedonism being true or false; other theories are discussed and taken seriously by him in Chapter 3, as well.<br /><br />Do you have any suggestions how to refute the non-identity issue that Benkei raises? How can "nothing" be "better off"?Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-64212379683628996562010-12-22T09:14:48.773-08:002010-12-22T09:14:48.773-08:00Jim, I noticed way back you said about Benatar'...Jim, I noticed way back you said about Benatar's book:<br /><br />"He then goes on to address the ‘non-identity problem’, whose proponents would assert renders the question meaningless, since comparing an existent entity to a fictitious, non-existent entity is invalid. This premise is refuted through some rather nifty argumentation (BUY THE BOOK)"<br /><br />Can you flesh out the nifty argumentation? I feel its needed for this argument. Also, are you familiar with Derek Parfit? Maybe he would be useful? <br /><br />http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonidentity-problem/Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-17466129060021293222010-12-22T07:13:35.299-08:002010-12-22T07:13:35.299-08:00The crux of of what Benatar is pointing out is tha...The crux of of what Benatar is pointing out is that he thinks its a nonesensical statement to say "not experiencing suffering is good (even if there is no actual person to experience the good of not suffering).Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-51353810881579307122010-12-22T07:04:26.576-08:002010-12-22T07:04:26.576-08:00For all those who care: the crux of Benkei's ...For all those who care: the crux of Benkei's argument is this... and he may have a point.. because he admits that it may not be good to "allow" life.. but you cannot talk about non-existent beings as if they are "better off".. which is what Benatar seems to indicate<br /><br />Benkei said:<br />Nothing doesn't have a form (which itself is a pseudo-statement but useful to illustrate!). The negation assumes that Nothing could have a form and that we can sensibly talk about nothing. It simply cannot be done logically. Linguistically yes and we even have meaningful sentences but an argument has to be logically consistent and this we cannot attain when using "nothing" as a noun.<br /><br />As I have stated before there may be very good reasons not to "allow" a particular couple to have kids because the suffering they would endure would be more than we think people should morally go through. That compares the possible suffering of children against an idea of what an acceptable life ought to be, it does not pit it against the "better state" of their non-existence.Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-66776992195583135672010-12-22T06:59:22.648-08:002010-12-22T06:59:22.648-08:00schopenhauer1 said:
For some particular definition...schopenhauer1 said:<br />For some particular definition of non-existent, Benkei might be correct to say that it is meaningless to compare it to existence. But that doesn't mean his argument is valid, since in this case non-existent refers to something that would otherwise exist -- in other words, we are talking about a specific form of the term "non-existence" which actually *can* be meaningfully compared to something that exists (and in fact that comparison is the whole point of talking about it).<br /><br />Benkei said:<br />I don't think you have fully grasped the point Carnap makes yet. A "non-existence that otherwise would exist" assumes that nothing can have potentiality but to claim that nothing has any qualities, automatically relegates the statement into a pseudo-statement. You go on to make another pseudo-statement when you say "a specific form of non-existence".<br /><br />Nothing doesn't have a form (which itself is a pseudo-statement but useful to illustrate!). The negation assumes that Nothing could have a form and that we can sensibly talk about nothing. It simply cannot be done logically. Linguistically yes and we even have meaningful sentences but an argument has to be logically consistent and this we cannot attain when using "nothing" as a noun.<br /><br />As I have stated before there may be very good reasons not to "allow" a particular couple to have kids because the suffering they would endure would be more than we think people should morally go through. That compares the possible suffering of children against an idea of what an acceptable life ought to be, it does not pit it against the "better state" of their non-existence.<br /><br />Also, I fail to see what the politician's syllogism has to do with anything here. It seems you are raising a strawman. If Benatar had committed that fallacy I would've pointed it out but this clearly hasn't been my argument.<br /><br />schopenhauer1 said:<br />He says absence of pain is good even if there is no one to experience that good, and that this is because the alternative is much worse. He also says absence of pleasure is not bad if there is no one to be deprived of the pleasure.<br /><br />Benatar said:<br />Even if we accept these statements it does not follow that therefore non-existence is better for the reasons that it does not make sense. And that is something Benatar concludes and bases his argument for anti-natalism on.Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-62795484649412303522010-12-22T06:58:58.755-08:002010-12-22T06:58:58.755-08:00Okay, everyone who is working on this... here is y...Okay, everyone who is working on this... here is your response from Benkei...Also Tim, I used the politician syllogism so I have to take that back, since I thought it might have pertained.. But maybe you can help me with these reactions:<br /><br />Benkei said:<br />schopenhauer1 wrote:<br /><br /><br />I am now Jehovah. Benkei has been a bad boy in my eyes, and I'm about to send him to the everlasting torments of hell. Forever and ever he will have the flesh flayed from him bones, over and over again. <br /><br />However...<br /><br />I have just finished the most delightful repast of ambrosia and dark beer, and am feeling...generous. I've decided to give Benkei an option of a simple, painless death. Back to non-existence, if he so chooses.<br /><br />Benkei said:<br />Of course the question can be posed and I prefer not to go through everlasting torment so I would opt for death. However, since I no longer exist I cannot claim to be better off, since I don't exist. My non-existence precludes me from making meaningful statements about the well-being of my non-existence and therefore precludes me from comparing it to my state of well-being while alive.<br /><br />The conclusion is therefore derived, not from a comparison of states between existence and no-existence, but a comparison between life as I know it and life as it would be. It is not that non-existence is better but that eternal suffering is unacceptable as I understand how life should be. <br />schopenhauer1<br />Someone could argue that a tree falling in the forest doesn't make a sound if there's no one to hear it -- and they are correct for a particular definition of "sound".<br /><br />Benkei:<br />If you think this is what I'm arguing, you really should read again. The tree that falls in your example still exists. For an honest comparison you should ask: "Does a non-existent tree still make a sound when it falls?" This is clearly absurd. The real mystery here is why you have such a hard time grasping the absurdity of Benatar's argument when he says much the same about non-existent persons.Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-52417356204318337742010-12-22T06:57:25.463-08:002010-12-22T06:57:25.463-08:00Benkei:
If you think this is what I'm arguing,...Benkei:<br />If you think this is what I'm arguing, you really should read again. The tree that falls in your example still exists. For an honest comparison you should ask: "Does a non-existent tree still make a sound when it falls?" This is clearly absurd. The real mystery here is why you have such a hard time grasping the absurdity of Benatar's argument when he says much the same about non-existent persons.<br /><br />schopenhauer1 said:<br />For some particular definition of non-existent, Benkei might be correct to say that it is meaningless to compare it to existence. But that doesn't mean his argument is valid, since in this case non-existent refers to something that would otherwise exist -- in other words, we are talking about a specific form of the term "non-existence" which actually *can* be meaningfully compared to something that exists (and in fact that comparison is the whole point of talking about it).<br /><br />Benkei said:<br />I don't think you have fully grasped the point Carnap makes yet. A "non-existence that otherwise would exist" assumes that nothing can have potentiality but to claim that nothing has any qualities, automatically relegates the statement into a pseudo-statement. You go on to make another pseudo-statement when you say "a specific form of non-existence".<br /><br />Nothing doesn't have a form (which itself is a pseudo-statement but useful to illustrate!). The negation assumes that Nothing could have a form and that we can sensibly talk about nothing. It simply cannot be done logically. Linguistically yes and we even have meaningful sentences but an argument has to be logically consistent and this we cannot attain when using "nothing" as a noun.<br /><br />As I have stated before there may be very good reasons not to "allow" a particular couple to have kids because the suffering they would endure would be more than we think people should morally go through. That compares the possible suffering of children against an idea of what an acceptable life ought to be, it does not pit it against the "better state" of their non-existence.<br /><br />Also, I fail to see what the politician's syllogism has to do with anything here. It seems you are raising a strawman. If Benatar had committed that fallacy I would've pointed it out but this clearly hasn't been my argument.<br /><br />schopenhauer1 said:<br />He says absence of pain is good even if there is no one to experience that good, and that this is because the alternative is much worse. He also says absence of pleasure is not bad if there is no one to be deprived of the pleasure.<br /><br />Benatar said:<br />Even if we accept these statements it does not follow that therefore non-existence is better for the reasons that it does not make sense. And that is something Benatar concludes and bases his argument for anti-natalism on.Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-86501274389783479062010-12-22T06:50:25.381-08:002010-12-22T06:50:25.381-08:00Does anyone else know how to refute this?Does anyone else know how to refute this?Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-68807077671322683852010-12-22T06:49:45.149-08:002010-12-22T06:49:45.149-08:00timcooijams, I need a slamdunk! hahatimcooijams, I need a slamdunk! hahaCompoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-7366413752535411362010-12-22T03:55:31.642-08:002010-12-22T03:55:31.642-08:00Whoops! The silly politician's syllogism exam...Whoops! The silly politician's syllogism example wasn't meant as an argument against any of what they said. It was just to show you what I think Carnap is about.<br /><br />As for Mako's post... Benatar judges the absence of pain "good" (even if there is no one to experience that good) by, I think, saying that if the potential person were existent, he would judge such an absence of pain good. So there's your agent.<br /><br />But, to answer your earlier question, I think it is also true that he would judge an absence of pleasure bad. I don't think this is a sleight of hand by Benatar, it's just unconvincing. Maybe I am interpreting things incorrectly, or maybe he could have been clearer. Maybe some of the more brainy folks here know?<br /><br />As I said, when Benatar justifies his choice of "good" for absence of pain, he says that he finds "not bad" to be "too weak": "Avoiding the pains of existence is more than merely 'not bad'. It is good." I'm not sure this is a judgment we can attribute to the agent.<br /><br />I don't think you should use any of this on the philosophy forum if you intend to win the argument. I think there are plenty of ways to lead people to see the light of antinatalism by appealing to popular opinion and intuition, but they won't cut it there either.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-27729675404683034892010-12-21T17:58:20.713-08:002010-12-21T17:58:20.713-08:00Timcooijmans, your first response to what you said...Timcooijmans, your first response to what you said.. Can you help with another response?<br /><br />schopenhauer1 wrote:<br />He says absence of pain is good even if there is no one to experience that good, and that this is because the alternative is much worse. He also says absence of pleasure is not bad if there is no one to be deprived of the pleasure.<br /><br />Mako said:<br />Your and Benatar's arguments both require a metaphysical assumption of good and bad being present prior to 'agency,' as if morality is itself somehow an intrinsic part of the universe. <br /><br />There is no evidence of that whatsover. Can you please justify why we should assume notions of goodness/badness as separate from agents who can determine these qualities? You can't simply argue by assertion. <br /><br />It's reasonable to assume that notions of good and bad derive from agency and that agents are 'necessary' conditions for goodness and badness to inhere. <br /><br />The possibility for bad-ness must also presume the possibility of good-ness. Your fatalistic solution precludes both.Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-77806718666024254442010-12-21T15:48:20.602-08:002010-12-21T15:48:20.602-08:00Luke, which "less wrong" argument do you...Luke, which "less wrong" argument do you think applies in this case?Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-70941317224759993882010-12-21T15:43:49.197-08:002010-12-21T15:43:49.197-08:00Jim, Timcooijmans, Luke, thanks you so much.. I am...Jim, Timcooijmans, Luke, thanks you so much.. I am using all of your arguments in my response.. I'll keep you informed on his response...<br /><br />Timcooijmans, I am a bit confused.. do you think Benatar successfully "tip toes" or is only a sleight of hand that isn't really getting around the issue?Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-86947917199743547862010-12-21T11:21:39.346-08:002010-12-21T11:21:39.346-08:00Compoverde, a good place to look for counterargume...Compoverde, a good place to look for counterarguments might be the Less Wrong sequence on the use and abuse of words.<br /><br />http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/A_Human%27s_Guide_to_Words<br /><br />Someone could argue that a tree falling in the forest doesn't make a sound if there's no one to hear it -- and they are correct for a particular definition of "sound".<br /><br />For some particular definition of non-existent, Benkei might be correct to say that it is meaningless to compare it to existence. But that doesn't mean his argument is valid, since in this case non-existent refers to something that would otherwise exist -- in other words, we are talking about a specific form of the term "non-existence" which actually *can* be meaningfully compared to something that exists (and in fact that comparison is the whole point of talking about it).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-59466586939729650992010-12-21T11:21:33.525-08:002010-12-21T11:21:33.525-08:00Well, there isn't much wrong with that passage...Well, there isn't much wrong with that passage in Carnap, as far as I can see. It just clarifies how some confusions can arise through improper use of natural language.<br /><br />Consider, for instance, the politician's syllogism:<br />1. something must be done<br />2. this is something<br />3. therefore, we must do it<br />The error in the reasoning becomes obvious (if it wasn't already) if you translate the statements into formal language:<br />1. ∃x Thing(x) ∧ MustBeDone(x) (there exists some x that is a thing and that must be done)<br />2. Thing(y) (y is a thing)<br />3. From 1 and 2, we get MustBeDone(y)<br /><br />But none of this applies to Benatar's argument. He isn't making such a silly mistake. In fact, he consciously tip-toes around it.<br /><br />He says absence of pain is good even if there is no one to experience that good, and that this is because the alternative is much worse. He also says absence of pleasure is not bad if there is no one to be deprived of the pleasure.<br /><br />But this is easily challenged by asserting that absence of pain is merely "not bad". Benatar just says that he finds this "too weak": "Avoiding the pains of existence is more than merely 'not bad'. It is good."<br /><br />Meh. That leaves a lot to be desired.<br /><br />In any case, Benkei's argument is just an assertion that antinatalism depends on dualism. It doesn't.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-91248964196235637802010-12-21T10:47:42.672-08:002010-12-21T10:47:42.672-08:00Haha, very good example Jim! I'll use that, s...Haha, very good example Jim! I'll use that, see what he says. He might be just keep saying "no no no", but then he would be doing what he supposedly says I do, which is illogically stick to a position for emotional reasons.Compoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-69801707218689092992010-12-21T10:43:52.657-08:002010-12-21T10:43:52.657-08:00Compoverde:
I'm on my way out the door, but h...Compoverde:<br /><br />I'm on my way out the door, but here's a quick shot.<br /><br />"I have never once said we cannot talk about potentials, I said you cannot compare nothing to something. You can talk about the potential suffering of people that will come into existence, you cannot talk about the non-suffering of non-existent people and then claim they're better off compared to potential people. It's utter nonsense, a pseudo-statement."<br /><br />I am now Jehovah. Benkei has been a bad boy in my eyes, and I'm about to send him to the everlasting torments of hell. Forever and ever he will have the flesh flayed from him bones, over and over again. <br /><br />However...<br /><br />I have just finished the most delightful repast of ambrosia and dark beer, and am feeling...generous. I've decided to give Benkei an option of a simple, painless death. Back to non-existence, if he so chooses.<br /><br />Now, I fully realize that some people are so fearful of the end of their conscious selves that they might foolishly opt for eternal torment instead. Different strokes, I suppose. But that's not the point of the question. In this scenario, we are comparing non-existence to eternal torment. Or in Benkei's words, a 'nothing' to a 'something'. A 'pseudo-life' to a real life, albeit not a particularly attractive one. Is his choice truly meaningless in this matter? Does consideration of the question make no sense? I beg to differ.<br /><br />Ok, enough with the hypotheticals. Gotta go hit the 'real' asphalt.metamorphhhhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12754527748086296743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-80136407080241865772010-12-21T10:24:31.750-08:002010-12-21T10:24:31.750-08:00The link to Carnap is here:
http://www.calstate...The link to Carnap is here: <br /><br />http://www.calstatela.edu/dept/phil/pdf/res/Carnap-Elimination-of-Metaphysics.pdfCompoverdehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09058139385845161301noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-354069516366024003.post-42150833454369999152010-12-21T10:23:38.878-08:002010-12-21T10:23:38.878-08:00Compoverde: Now that would just be silly, wouldn&#...Compoverde: Now that would just be silly, wouldn't it? :)metamorphhhhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12754527748086296743noreply@blogger.com