I've thought that there might be a way to finesse the "Good" in the upper right quadrant ("Absence of Pain") of the "never exists" scenario into a "Not Bad"; and thus have:
Bad/Good vs. Not Bad/Not Bad
But even if a plausible account of symmetry could be made of this, it would be at the cost of abandoning connection with the common judgements the asymmetry explains.
And of course nothing changes the fact that unless you accept an Epicurean view of death, breeding is still, as Benatar colorfully puts it (on page 92), procreational Russian roulette with a fully loaded gun aimed one's future offspring.
The only potential weak point in Benatar's argument I've been able to envision is his distinction between subjective and objective quality of life. I wonder if he doesn't give short shrift to the extent to which the former is constitutive of, rather merely a component of, the latter.
"And of course nothing changes the fact that unless you accept an Epicurean view of death, breeding is still, as Benatar colorfully puts it (on page 92), procreational Russian roulette with a fully loaded gun aimed one's future offspring."
This is still the most persuasive part of the argument to me, regarding both the circumstantial aspects of a specific life, as well as the final, universal aspect i.e. inevitable death.
Consider two fields. One is empty. The other is sprinkled with Easter baskets, merry-go-rounds and hayrides, but is also randomly planted with land mines, acid-filled swamps, and poisoned apples. Which field do you let your kids play in? :)
The last part of the essay I find partially agreeable: Living is better in some ways and worse in others than non-existing. I take this to mean that while existing lets us partake in pleasures, it also inevitably inflicts all of us with at least some pain - all too often to the level/the point of making some people very unhappy with life.
Also, the author claims that as long as a life is a good life, it's better to have it created. However, this claim has a fighting chance of being true ONLY if we had perfect knowledge of the future.
Again, there's no way to know if a person will have a good life if he/she will exist but doesn't so yet. The child could live the proverbial wonderful life or it could live a harmfully low quality of life. At least leaving a person in a non-existent state leaves that person no worse off than we all will be 1 mega-giga-quadrillion years from now (unless you are a theist, in which case there's a very good chance that person will be have a tormenting afterlife. Jesus didn't say "many are called, but few are chosen" for nothing, after all. But this isn't a religion blog, so I'll stop).
I can't help wondering if Bradley's footnote was a face-saving afterthought. Benatar's formulation of value as being "for a person" (potentially) seems to anticipate the and to crucially qualify the "simpliciter" account upon which his criticism is mounted. He steps around it.
Dandling modifier correction: by "his criticism," I mean Bradley's.
Also, I agree with Rob and others regarding the countermanding weight of epistemic uncertainty.
Also, it seems relevant that the absence of experiential deprivation (good when considered against potential harm) is eternal. I'm not sure that Bradley's critique appreciates that point, even when the "person" is removed from the accounting.
Chip, it is very possible that you are right about the footnote. After all, Yujin Nagasawa just abridged his review after receiving a commentary from DB, instead of coming up with new arguments.
filrabat: 'Also, the author claims that as long as a life is a good life, it's better to have it created. However, this claim has a fighting chance of being true ONLY if we had perfect knowledge of the future.'
Yeah, I was thinking this the whole time, as well.
Chip: 'Also, it seems relevant that the absence of experiential deprivation (good when considered against potential harm) is eternal. I'm not sure that Bradley's critique appreciates that point...'
Yeah, I was thinking about this today. I'd love to see a response from Benatar on this one. Do you know if anything's available?
10 comments:
I've thought that there might be a way to finesse the "Good" in the upper right quadrant ("Absence of Pain") of the "never exists" scenario into a "Not Bad"; and thus have:
Bad/Good vs. Not Bad/Not Bad
But even if a plausible account of symmetry could be made of this, it would be at the cost of abandoning connection with the common judgements the asymmetry explains.
And of course nothing changes the fact that unless you accept an Epicurean view of death, breeding is still, as Benatar colorfully puts it (on page 92), procreational Russian roulette with a fully loaded gun aimed one's future offspring.
The only potential weak point in Benatar's argument I've been able to envision is his distinction between subjective and objective quality of life. I wonder if he doesn't give short shrift to the extent to which the former is constitutive of, rather merely a component of, the latter.
Rob:
"And of course nothing changes the fact that unless you accept an Epicurean view of death, breeding is still, as Benatar colorfully puts it (on page 92), procreational Russian roulette with a fully loaded gun aimed one's future offspring."
This is still the most persuasive part of the argument to me, regarding both the circumstantial aspects of a specific life, as well as the final, universal aspect i.e. inevitable death.
Consider two fields. One is empty. The other is sprinkled with Easter baskets, merry-go-rounds and hayrides, but is also randomly planted with land mines, acid-filled swamps, and poisoned apples. Which field do you let your kids play in? :)
Which field do you let your kids play in? :)
Gee, that´s a tough one, i tell ya..
LoL
Yeah, I had thought of the minefield analogy as well... (great minds, etc. :-))
Parents having "good intentions" are like those that drop their children in a minefield and then say "I sure hope you don't step on a mine!"
And regarding suicide...
"If you don't like it that you've been dropped into a minefield, why don't you step on a mine!" just doesn't cut it.
The last part of the essay I find partially agreeable: Living is better in some ways and worse in others than non-existing. I take this to mean that while existing lets us partake in pleasures, it also inevitably inflicts all of us with at least some pain - all too often to the level/the point of making some people very unhappy with life.
Also, the author claims that as long as a life is a good life, it's better to have it created. However, this claim has a fighting chance of being true ONLY if we had perfect knowledge of the future.
Again, there's no way to know if a person will have a good life if he/she will exist but doesn't so yet. The child could live the proverbial wonderful life or it could live a harmfully low quality of life. At least leaving a person in a non-existent state leaves that person no worse off than we all will be 1 mega-giga-quadrillion years from now (unless you are a theist, in which case there's a very good chance that person will be have a tormenting afterlife. Jesus didn't say "many are called, but few are chosen" for nothing, after all. But this isn't a religion blog, so I'll stop).
I can't help wondering if Bradley's footnote was a face-saving afterthought. Benatar's formulation of value as being "for a person" (potentially) seems to anticipate the and to crucially qualify the "simpliciter" account upon which his criticism is mounted. He steps around it.
Dandling modifier correction: by "his criticism," I mean Bradley's.
Also, I agree with Rob and others regarding the countermanding weight of epistemic uncertainty.
Also, it seems relevant that the absence of experiential deprivation (good when considered against potential harm) is eternal. I'm not sure that Bradley's critique appreciates that point, even when the "person" is removed from the accounting.
Chip, it is very possible that you are right about the footnote. After all, Yujin Nagasawa just abridged his review after receiving a commentary from DB, instead of coming up with new arguments.
Plague Doctor: Very good points.
filrabat: 'Also, the author claims that as long as a life is a good life, it's better to have it created. However, this claim has a fighting chance of being true ONLY if we had perfect knowledge of the future.'
Yeah, I was thinking this the whole time, as well.
Chip: 'Also, it seems relevant that the absence of experiential deprivation (good when considered against potential harm) is eternal. I'm not sure that Bradley's critique appreciates that point...'
Yeah, I was thinking about this today. I'd love to see a response from Benatar on this one. Do you know if anything's available?
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